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SHIFTS AND ZMPLICATIONS OF FEDERALISM POR CIVIL RIGHTS

By J. Clay Smith, Jr.l
In United State v. Loper the Court determined that a federal
statute, the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, which makes it a
federal crime for any individual knowingly to possess firearms
within a school zone, exceeded the powers of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. While on its face this case may not appear to have
relevance to civil rights, the present anti-government environment
does

not

permit

me

to

rest

on

an

assumption

that

segments

attempting to undermine civil rights laws will not at some point
challenge the power of Congress to limit regulation in the area of
civil rights.
Before addressing the issues raised in Lopez, I wish to muse
about three important civil rights cases just to stretch our minds
to the negative or positive potential of Lopez.
Jim Crow Era:

In 1875,

The Civil Rights Cases of 1883

during the Reconstruction era,

Congress passed a

public accommodations law which broadly proscribed discrimination
in "inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement. n For the first time in American history
. v
!

,
,

1
Comments before The Law Professor Section's Seminar on
"Substantive Review of Recent u. S. Supreme Court Decisions, It during
the National Bar Association's 70th Annual Meeting during held at
the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Baltimore, Md., August 3, 1995. Professor
Smith is a Professor at Howard University School of Law and is
Visiting Professor of Law at Georgetown Law Center for the 19951996 academic year.

2

115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).

;

.

Black Americans believed that Congress had helped to advance
equality in the area of public accommodations. They were right. But
in 1883, shortly after the federal troops were withdrawn from the
South and the collapse of the Reconstruction era was ongoing, the
u.S. Supreme Court, in deciding The Civil Rights Cases, determined
that the Act of 1875 was unconstitutional because the it failed to
limit the categories of affected businesses to those impinging upon
interstate commerce. 3
While Black people in the South and North did not fully
understand

the

jurisprudential

basis

understood that white businesses could,
exclude them from their inns,

of

this

decision,

they

on the basis of race,

segregate them in their public

conveyances on land and water; exclude them from or segregate them
in their theaters and other places of amusement. Black Americans
understood racial discrimination at will to be within the allowance
of traditional governmental functions, popularly referred to as
states' rights.
Black lawyers knew what had happened. 4 They knew that the U. S.
Supreme Court had emboldened the principle of states' rights in the
law against the equality of Black people in the country. Black
lawyers and their allies knew full well that while government could
not make Black people equal in the eyes of white people,

its

: \I

3

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

4 J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 18441944, at 221-222 (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia:
1993), where II [Richard] Greener [a Black graduate of the University
of South Carolina's law school] called the court's decision 'the
most startling decision.
since [Dred Scott] .'11 Id. at 222.

2

actions and inactions could re-enslave them. Today, the notion of
states' rights fall under a category that some scholars refer to as
federal-based limits.
Federal-based limits is analogous to a separation of powers
principle.

Of course, we are well aware of the separation of

powers principle applicable to the national government that checks
the powers of the coordinate branches of government. The purpose of
the doctrine is to limit the power of any branch of government so
that no single branch is superior to the other, and to protect
against tyranny. Over the years, political operatives, political
pundits, law and political science scholars, lawyers, and court
watchers have argued about and written volumes of books about
horizontal separation of powers,

and their concerns about and

definition of tyranny. And so it is also with federal-based limits,
which encompasses the vertical powers reserved to the states under
the Tenth Amendment, the enumerated powers vested in Congress under
the

Commerce

government

Clause

expressed

and
or

incidental
implied

in

powers
other

of

the

provisions

national
of

the

Constitution.
After the

u.s.

Supreme Court struck down the Civil Rights Act

of 1875, unless state laws were passed to protect Black people from
racial discrimination by private concerns, it has been said that
I

\J

the Congress by its silence to pass such laws, condoned affirmative
acts of discrimination. 5
95 U.S. 485, 498 (1877) (Clifford, J.,
5 See Hall v. DeCUir,
concurring, discussed in J. Clay Smith, Jr., Justice and
Jurisprudence and the Black Lawyer, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1077, 10983

The Heart of Atlanta Motel & Katzenback Motel Decisions

Between 1883 and 1964, some local state governments did pass
civil rights laws prohibiting various forms of discrimination, 6 but
many of these laws were not comprehensive in coverage. Many of
these

laws

were

prohibitory

in

nature

with

no

corrective

provisions, and with no state agencies dedicated solely to the
enforcement of these laws. The civil rights movement of the 1960s
and the recognition by the business community and Congress that
segregation in the South was an obstruction to American enterprise
and morally wrong, passed Title II, Sec. 201 (a), of the civil
Rights Act of 1964, which provides:
All

persons

employment

shall
of

be

the

entitled
goods,

to

full

services,

and

equal

facilities,

privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place
of public accommodation,
without discrimination,

as defined in this section,
segregation on the ground of

race, color, religion, or national origin.
Section 201(b) of Title II establishes four classes of business
establishments, each of which "serves the public ll and nis a place
of public accommodation n within the meaning of Sec. 201 (a) "if its
operations affect commerce, or if discrimination or segregation by

99 (1994).
6 For example,
in 1886, three years after the Court struck
down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, a black lawyer named John W.E.
Thomas, who was a member of the Illinois General Assembly,
introduced, and the legislature adopted, a civil righ~s law with
some of the provisions contained in the civil Rights Act of 1875.
EMANCIPATION, supra note 4, at 372-73.

4

it is supported by State action.

II

Under the Act, Title II includes

four categories termed as lIestablishments ll ; namely,
any inn, motel, or other establishment which provides
lodging to transient guest, other than an establishment
located within a building which contains not more than
five

rooms

for

rent or hire and which is actually

occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his
residence ....
Finally, 201{c) defines the phrase "affect commerce" as applied to
the above establishments declaring that lIany inn, hotel, motel, or
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guest
"affects commerce per se."
In 1964, the u.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of Title II in two major cases:

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S.,'

and Ka tzenbach v. McClung. 8 The core underpinnings of the Court' s
determination in these cases is that Congress has the power to
legislate against moral and social wrongs, and that discrimination
in accommodations on account of race, color, religion or national
origin under Title II is well within the powers of Congress. The
Court determined that even without specific findings by Congress,
its proceedings were sufficient to demonstrate that racism was a
moral and social wrong 9 coupled with its nthe disruptive effect
t

, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
8

9

'I

379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 257.
5

. .....

..

.

.,

that racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. 1110
In Katzenbach, the Court upheld Title II on a challenge by
Appellees claiming that the Act could not be sustained in the
absence of findings by Congress. The Court determined that the
absence of findings was of no consequence in the face of "an
impressive array of testimony that discrimination in restaurants
had a direct and highly restrictive effect upon interstate travel
by Negroes.

1111

The Court opined that the aggregate affect of

discrimination had a direct impact on interstate commerce without
the need for particular findings per enterprise. 12
Federal-based Implications oE Lopez
Back to Lopez.
What was Congress attempting to achieve when it passed the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990? It was simply attempting to keep
guns away from public schools and to demonstrate the extent to
which intra-state fatalities of our young due to violence has a
direct or indirect -impact on commerce, indeed; the future of our
nation.13

Was

the

purpose

and

intent

of

the

appropriately grounded in the powers of Congress?

legislation
A majority of

10 Id. The Court further opined that nthe power of Congress to
promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the
local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the
States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial
and harmful effect upon~that commerce. U Id. at 258.
11

Katzenbach, 379 U. S. 300.

12

Id. at 301, citing Polish Alliance v. Labor Board, 322 U.S.

643, 648

(1944).

13 Lopez,
115 S.Ct. 1651 (Justice Stevens, dissenting), Id.
(Justice Souter, dissenting), 1657 (Justice Breyer, dissenting) .

.J

6

the Court held that the operative provision (sec. 922(q»14 could
not be justified because firearms possession within a local school
zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Hence, sec.
922 (q)

of the Gun-Free School Act of 1990 was held to exceed

authorized

federal-based

limits.

Stated differently,

the

Act

stepped on states' rights to regulate crime relevant to public
schools.
As I

see it,

Lopez is part of an ongoing political and

judicial debate on how much power the Congress has to regulate
American life.

A current sub-set of that inquiry is' the extent to

which Congress will exercise its legitimate power to regulate in
the field of civil rights. Presently, affirmative action is at the
core of this debate. 1s While affirmative action is not directly the
subject of my talk, it is the match that is being used to ignite
and spread the fire of intolerance to other civil rights fields.
My concern reaches back to The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 (and
Hall v. DeCuir (1877») 16 where the U. S. Supreme Court held that

rights

civil

laws

prohibiting

discrimination

in

public

accommodation was unconstitutional. 17 Today, a legitimate question
is whether current civil rights laws are within the sight of fire

14 Id. (passim).
~I

Kevin Merida, Doie Aims at Affirmative Action, WASH. POST,
July 28, 1995, at A10; Louis Harris, Affirmative Action and the
Voter, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995,. at A13; Benjamin Wittes, An
Affirmative Action Parable, WASH. LE~ TIMES, July 24, 1995, at 1.
15

)

16

See Justice and Jurisprudence, supra note 5.

17

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
7

of a Court tilting fast to the far right and once again trapping
Black people

between cases

like

The

Civil

Rights

Cases

and

DeCuir?18
Federal-based Limits: The Next Century

In the next century, could the Court declare that the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting, inter alia, racial discrimination
in employment, housing, public accommodations, places of public
amusement is beyond the reach of federal power? Could federal-based
limits

be

turned against Black people,

and others

presently

protected under the protection of the Civil Rights Act of

19~4?

The Lopez decision does not immediately answer any of these
questions. Some might even say that a general reading of Lopez
makes my questions appear preposterous.

If Lopez is a general

concern about the limits of government, why do Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy in their concurring opinions rightly assure us that two
key civil rights decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act of 1964
are

II

authorities

. wi thin the fair

ambit

of

the

Court's

practical conception of commercial regulation [that] are not called
in question by our decision today. 1119
I agree with Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. In fact,

I am

elated by the astute message that these two justices communicated
to the civil rights community and to those whose aim is to
, t

dismantle federal power'to regulate in civil rights areas covered
by Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, etc. What
18

Justice and Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 1099.

19 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637 (emphasis added) .

)

8

concerns me is what civil rights cases or laws may be called into
question, if any?
With the possible exceptions of Justice O'Connor and Kennedy
(and the four justices in dissent)

,20

I cannot bring myself to

believe that the aim of C.J. Rehnquist is isolated to the facts of
Lopez, though, hopefully, my belief may ultimately prove to be

misplaced. I believe that Lopez may give rise to a jurisprudential
thrust that could deconstruct the power of Congress to regulate
nsubject matter activityll in the field of civil rights,

and I

believe that both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy are not only aware
of this possibility, but could be concerned about it.
I'd like to press my case further: Just note the list of cases
that Justice Rehnquist cites in Lopez following this statement:
"But even ... modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject
to outer limits [and that] the Court has heeded that warning and
undertaken

to

decide

concluding

that

a

whether

a

regulated

rational

activity

basis

existed

sufficiently

for

affected

interstate commerce. 1121 Note also the supporting footnote to the
prior quote which says,
that

a

particular

II

[S] imply because Congress may conclude

activity

substantially

commerce does not necessarily make it

20

Supra note 13.

21

Lopez, 115·· S. Ct. 1628-29.

SO.1I22

affects

interstate

Incidentally, both

22
Id. at 1629, n.2, also citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981).
1:.

J

9

Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach are listed among the four

cases connected with the footnote.
What is the point? Does the quoted text (in Lopez) mean that
the per se determination by Congress that any "inn, hotel, motel,
or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guest
affects commerce per se" as determined in Heart of Atlanta Motel is
now under a cloud? I believe that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
have adequately answered this question in the negative, thereby
sealing for now a solid majority to uphold Heart of Atlanta Motel
and Katzenbach. 23
My instincts cause me to be more than casually concerned about
C. J.

Rehnquist' s preoccupation with Justice Black's concurring

opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel,

cited in footnote 2 of the

majority opinion, which states, "[W]hether particular operations
affect

interstate

commerce

sufficiently

to

come

under

the

constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a
judicial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled
finally only by this Court. ,,24
Query, after Lopez, absent findings or with them, how much of
a record is enough of a record to sustain an action of Congress

23 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637. Further, the holding- of the Court in
Katzenbach firmly suppqnts the continued validity of Heart of
Atlanta Motel. There Justice Clark stated, "We think in so doing
that Congress acted well within its powers to protect and foster
commerce in extending the coverage of Title I I only to those
restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or serving food,
a substantial portion of which has moved in interstate commerce."
Katzenback, 379 U.S. 304.
.
24

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1629, n.2 (emphasis. added) .

10

under the Commerce Clause? It is my opinion that in Lopez C.J.
Rehnquist, whether purposely or inadvertently, has placed within
the sights for judicial deconstruction the broad reach of acts of
Congress in the field of civil rights and other social legislation
that aid exceptionally affected groups, such as Black people, and
the general population.
In exploring the quantum of such an inquiry, is the Court
acting under the guise of "judgement" 1 or "will?U 2s will we now see
the

development

of

standards

or

weights

of

congressional

proceedings emerge under civil rights legislation similar to the
federal rules of evidence and procedure? Will more actions of
Congress now be challenged? Will the prudential components now be
further relaxed26 allowing greater access to the courts to bring
actions against laws passed by Congress? Will the potential reach
of Lopez create in practice the supremacy of the states over the
national government?
Is there a positive side to Lopez? Will civil rights groups
take advantage of the liberal standing allotment in Adarand v.
Pe:iia,27

to challenge acts of Congress that either transfer too much

authority to the states or private concerns, perhaps, arguing that
excessive grants of power to the states or allowing agencies to
transfer public power to private concerns is violative of federal-

2S See Stone, Seidman, Sunstein
(1991 edition).

26
27

&

Tushnet, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 19

See Adarand v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2104 (1995).
. . --:,-

-

Id.

11

based limits imposed by the Commerce Clause or violative of the
nondelegation doctrine,

respectively?

I

wonder how the federal

judiciary will resolve these questions.
I

also note

that

nowhere

in Justice

Thomas's

concurring

opinion does he mention any civil rights cases or make mention of
the concurring statement of Justices 0' Connor and Kennedy that

Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach decisions are "within the
fair ambit of.
question by

. commercial regulation and are not called in

[Lopez]-.;_'~28

Squeals of Terror
A "squeal of terror went up in some quarters" 29 when Lopez was
announced by the Court. Some quarters argue that based on the facts
of Lopez,

the "squeals" raise a false alarm.

I

remind you that

attempts were made to divert the attention of the Black community
from similarly "squeals of terror" when the Court began to whittle
away at the civil rights laws passed during the Reconstruction
era. 30

Were these squeals misplaced?

The

civil rights

community and people of good will,

who

believe in fairness, and abhor harm that could befall Black people

in this country must not be mislead or misdirected about the
reaches of Lopez under the control of what appears to be a decision

28

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1637.

29

Federalism'S Future, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at A20.

30 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM:
A HISTORY OF NEGRO
AMERIONS 297-343 (Alfred A. Knopf, N.Y.: 1970). See generally ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Harper &
RoW, Publishers~ N.Y.: 1988).
.

·

1

-.

-.

that invites a reexamination of the limits of federal-based power
and so-called application of rules of original understanding31
using formalism as the Court's tool of decisionmaking.

31

L opez, 115 S .Ct. 1644, n.2

13

(Thomas, J., concurring).

